he international foreign policy gains of Keir Starmer (UK), Emmanuel Macron (France), and Friedrich Merz (Germany) stand in sharp contrast to their domestic difficulties. When UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosts President Trump at his Chequers country residence next week for a state visit, the meeting is intended to highlight Starmer’s role on the world stage—leveraging his relationship with Trump to strengthen the defence of Ukraine against a belligerent Russia.
Yet at home, Starmer is dealing with setbacks—from his deputy’s resignation amid tax controversies, to the dismissal of his ambassador in Washington over connections with Jeffrey Epstein. Add to that falling poll numbers and rising pressure from right-wing populists.

Still, experts wonder how long this balance can hold: projecting strength abroad while faltering at home. Political fragmentation in the UK, France, and Germany has left centrist governments preoccupied with immigration, the economy, and internal strife—fearful of losing power. In France, for example, Macron’s replacement of Prime Minister François Bayrou came quickly after the latter’s exit, but the new PM, Sébastien Lecornu, must navigate a parliament polarized between far-right and far-left groups, which seem more focused on triggering early elections than on governing responsibly.
Support for Ukraine remains broadly high across Europe, but long-term support will be strained if leaders fail to address domestic economic vulnerabilities. The current unity risks splitting under pressure—especially if European nations are asked for more than financial or diplomatic support (e.g. troops), or if centrist leaderships cede ground to more extreme alternatives.

“Europeans are limited in what they can do beyond their borders because of what they’re not doing within their borders,” says Richard N. Haass, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations. He once wrote, “Foreign Policy Begins at Home.”
Haass argues that what unites these leaders is their reaction to the severity of Putin’s actions and what they perceive as a sudden challenge to the old post-World War II order. Domestic challenges have in many cases pushed them to pursue foreign policy wins as more attainable in comparison to solving entrenched internal issues—something reminiscent of past leaders from Winston Churchill to Richard Nixon.
These ambitions are turning into results: European states have committed to significant increases in defence spending; are buying armaments (often from the US) to support Ukraine; and are organizing a so-called coalition of willing states to secure Ukraine once any peace agreement is reached.

But the bigger test is whether Europe can reduce its long-standing reliance on American security guarantees. Such a transformation will demand sustained political commitment across multiple administrations—a difficult prospect in times of volatility.
Poland is a case in point: its centrist Prime Minister Donald Tusk has been staunchly pro-Ukraine, but after a right-wing president, Karol Nawrocki, was elected—who opposes Ukraine’s EU accession—the country is divided over refugee policy and its stance toward Ukraine more broadly.
In Germany, Merz began by securing eased restrictions on state borrowing to help fund large increases in defence budgets. At a recent gathering of European leaders at the White House, he pushed for US pressure on Vladimir Putin to accept a ceasefire in Ukraine. He claimed afterwards: “We were well prepared and well coordinated… I think that really pleased the American president, in the sense that he noticed that we Europeans are speaking with one voice here.” Still, back in Berlin his coalition (center-right Christian Democrats and center-left Social Democrats) has adopted cautious approaches, disappointing many observers.

A contentious issue has been the nomination of a liberal judge to Germany’s highest court, which split the coalition over her views on abortion and other social issues. Meanwhile, the far-right party Alternative for Germany is gaining in the polls, now ahead of Merz’s Christian Democrats—posing a threat of political fragmentation, disunity, and loss of cohesion. As Constanze Stelzenmüller of the Brookings Institution puts it: “Merz’s key task is to make sure they succeed with none of it.”
Macron, whose presidential term runs until 2027, finds himself in a “lame duck” phase. France’s system grants strong foreign policy leverage to its president, but recent failures—such as a miscalculated parliamentary election—have curtailed his domestic standing. Some advisers believe that his domestic difficulties provide more space to focus internationally. However, without financial capacity to match his diplomatic ambition, France struggles to back up its plans. As one analyst put it: “Macron has a policy but no ability to back it up, because France is bankrupt.”
The situation is different for Starmer in the UK. He enjoys a strong majority in Parliament, and has no pressing need to call an election until 2029. Even though his opponents (including populists) make noise, his position appears more secure than that of Macron or Merz. Peter Ricketts notes: “As long as a British prime minister has a stable, secure majority in the Parliament, he has a relatively free hand.”


